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The Frankish noble dynasty of the eighth and ninth
centuries, the Carolingians—named for Charles “The
Hammer” Martel, the “founding father” of the
Carolingians—supplanted the Merovingian “long-haired
kings” as the ruling Frankish power. 1 The full extent of the
impressive Carolingian power during the reign of
Charlemagne was made possible by an overall grand
strategy whose genesis lay in a fundamental propensity
toward prompt violence in settling matters and meting out
justice to ensure order. A martial political structure, put in
place by Pepin of Herstal (who might be considered a
“proto-Carolingian”), Martel, and his son Pepin the Short,
was also a factor.2 Although most historians consider
Charlemagne’s reign successful, the state of affairs after
his death was precarious. With a focus on what Dutton
calls the “Carolingian civilization,” this paper explores the
nature and the impact of war and violence as determinative
factors in Carolingian formation and duration, primarily
using the assemblage of primary sources collated by
Dutton and supplemented by notable secondary sources.3
Moreover, this paper will examine the extent to which the
violent and warring “Carolingian world”—the appellation
preferred by Costambey, Innes, and MacLean—influenced
the direction of the Middle Ages and the development of
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Europe.4 The Carolingian civilization was relatively shortlived. War and violence were central core components
during its entire period, despite contemporaries
considering it a Christian empire (a theocratic monarchy
under Charlemagne and Louis the Pious).
From the inception of the so-called Carolingian
civilization, violence was conventional, just, and proper—
even institutionalized and necessary. 5 Bachrach makes a
persuasive argument that the Carolingians implemented a
long-term grand strategy that developed Carolingian
military and political assets to define and ensconce the
Carolingian polity among its neighbors and in the Western
world based on the use of just war and violence. 6 This
grand strategy began with Pepin of Herstal. It was
strengthened by Martel and Pepin the Short before
Charlemagne skillfully brought it to bear in its complete
application in the late eighth and early ninth centuries. The
early Carolingians did not necessarily possess any
forethought about how such a grand strategy would affect
the course of future events. However, it appears they did
conscientiously work toward constructing and enhancing
the Kingdom of the Franks through a mission they
believed to be endowed by God. The Franks were confident
they were God’s chosen people; therefore, war and
violence at the hands of the Carolingians to carry out God’s
divine justice in the name of expanding the Regnum
Francorum was perfectly reasonable. 7 The early
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5
Janet L. Nelson, “Carolingian Violence and the Ritualization of
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Carolingians used war, violence, and diplomatic and
economic resources over three generations to execute this
long-term mission.8 Charlemagne reaped the benefits of
this grand Carolingian strategy and the course of medieval
European history was substantially shaped by it. In
contemporary hagiographies, biographies, and poetry,
violence and war were often front and center in Carolingian
civilization. An early example during the genesis period of
the Carolingians exists in correspondence from Pope
Gregory II to Charles Martel, December 722, shortly after
Martel had been victorious in a Frankish Civil War and
became the official Mayor of the Palace. In the
correspondence, Pope Gregory II recommended the Bishop
Boniface to Martel and entreated Martel to defend
Boniface “against every enemy.”9 The very fact that the
Pope requested that Martel—already renowned for his
martial prowess and battlefield leadership acumen—
provide physical protection of Boniface, tacitly by way of
violence if necessary, was telling. Violence was
acceptable, even preferable under certain circumstances. To
be sure, this predilection for violence did not begin with the
Carolingians; the Merovingians—whom the Carolingians
had initially served and eventually succeeded—had
already demonstrated that violence and war were not only
acceptable but often preferable. Merovingian ruler Clovis,
for example, regularly opted for violence to instill and keep
order, as recorded by Gregory of Tours. 10 The
Merovingians also used violence to ensure that insolence to
God received just retribution. This tradition for the Franks
had existed as early as the fifth and sixth centuries. Thus,
Martel and subsequent Carolingians merely adopted and
Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 1-5.
“Pope Gregory II Recommends Boniface to Charles Martel,
December 722,” in Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition,
ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 5-6.
10
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perfected what the Merovingians had already practiced for
centuries. Contemporaries held the following to be great
virtues: martial skills, military prowess, the ability to win
battles, the skills and propensity to execute violent acts
when necessary, and the ability to command armies.
Charles Martel—b. 688, d. 741—was the exemplar.
Chroniclers even compared him to Joshua of the Hebrew
Old Testament. Martel, like Joshua, could ostensibly count
on the infinite, supernatural power of God to assist him in
crushing the enemies of God and carrying out the grand
Carolingian strategy. To be sure, violence and war came
naturally to Martel. His nickname “Martellus”—or “the
Hammer”—was derived from a disposition composed of
fierceness, bellicosity, and courage, even from an early
age.11 Descended from noble ancestors—the Arnulfing and
Pippinid clans of the 7th century—Martel came to power
because the Merovingian kings had given great power to
the Pippinid Mayors of the Palace. The latter had
essentially become the de facto rulers of Frankish
Austrasia. In a violent Frankish Civil War lasting from 715
to 718, Martel led a number of battles, the Battle of
Amblève prominent among them, and gained significantly
in reputation as a warrior and battlefield commander. He
became Mayor of the Palace of both Austrasia and
neighboring Neustria, the western realm of the Kingdom of
the Franks. He then launched a long period of military
expansion, engaging in war and violence with great
alacrity, aplomb, and aptitude until he died in 741. Such a
protracted period of war and violence arguably led to an
increasingly embedded martial ethos in Carolingian
society and political structure and set the stage for
Charlemagne’s successful future reign. 12
Martel is best known for his victory in 732 against
Paul Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel (Harlow: Pearson
Education Limited, 2000), 1.
12
Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel, 146.
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the invading forces of the Umayyad Caliphate, led by
Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi, at the Battle of Poitiers in
west-central Francia. In control of Spain since 711, the
Umayyad Caliphate had executed military campaigns that
pushed up into southern Francia across the Pyrenees
Mountains and now threatened central Francia. The
measure of the true impact of this battle is sometimes a
contested issue among historians. Some historians—such
as Edward Gibbon—argue that the battle was highly
influential in the course of events for Europe and indeed
the Carolingian Dynasty itself. For Gibbon, if the battle
had turned out differently, the outcome was clear. In
classic Gibbon style, he wrote: “Perhaps the interpretation
of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of
Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a
circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation
of Mahomet.”13 For Einhard, Charlemagne’s chronicler,
and not exactly known for impartiality, Martel’s victory at
Poitiers was anything but inconsequential. Einhard wrote
that Martel “so completely defeated the Saracens, who
were attempting to occupy Gaul, in two great battles – the
first in Aquitaine near the city of Poitiers and the second
near Narbonne on the River Berne – that he forced them to
fall back into Spain.”14
For other historians, the Battle of Poitiers had little
effect and is often downplayed. The general assertion is
that the Umayyad incursion was nothing more than a
minor raid for booty and would not have necessarily
resulted in a permanent foothold; moreover, the Muslims

Edward Gibbon, “Chapter 52,” in The History of the Decline and
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Toronto Press, 2004), 28.
13

6

Spring 2022

were overextended and spent.15 These points are
contestable. If one is to properly assess the true and full
implications of the battle’s outcome for the course of the
Middle Ages, one must consider any reasonable
alternative effects. With the hindsight of Martel’s victory
at the Battle of Poitiers, it is easy to say that the battle was
not particularly of consequence; however, there are indeed
different potential outcomes to consider had the fortunes
of Martel been reversed at the Battle of Poitiers. 16
Gibbon’s interpretation is hyperbolic, to be sure,
and it is important not to overstate the implications of the
battle’s outcome. Indeed, it is an arduous and problematic
argument that the Muslims could, or would, have
conquered substantially more European territory than they
did historically, or that Shari’a law would have been
imposed on Britons and Anglo-Saxons by conquering
Muslims in Britain. Nonetheless, the significance of the
battle should not be understated either. There is a
compelling argument to be made that had the Umayyad
Caliphate’s army been victorious, other raids might well
have followed in Francia, sapping Francia of wealth, order,
and morale. What is more, it is reasonable to posit that
Martel and his forces would have been weakened.
Weakened or damaged Frankish forces under Martel would
have left him—if he even managed to personally survive a
defeat—exposed to future Umayyad raids and challenges
from others seeking power within the Frankish realm. At
the very least, his reputation may well have suffered.
15
Roger Collins, The Arab Conquest of Spain: 710–797 (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 1989), 87-91; see Alessandro Barbero,
Charlemagne: Father of a Continent (Oakland: University of
California Press, 2004), 10; see also Tomaž Mastnak, Crusading
Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and Western Political Order
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2002), 99-100.
16
Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the
Rise of Western Power (New York: Anchor Books, A Division of
Random House, 2001), 167.
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Furthermore, it is possible he would not have been able to
assume power in the aftermath of Merovingian King
Theuderic IV’s death in 737.
Regardless of whether the purpose of the Umayyad
incursion into central Francia was to extend the Islamic
realm and acquire Frankish territory or to gain spoils
(although there are references in Muslim literature to those
who died at the battle as martyrs for Islam), a victory by
Islamic forces in 732 at the Battle of Poitiers could have
led to a dramatically different course for the developing
Carolingian civilization. 17 It is most often injudicious to
point to singular events throughout history as “turning
points;” the course of history is reliant on a myriad of
interconnected factors and circumstances. Nonetheless, it is
conceivable that an alternate outcome at the Battle of
Poitiers would have led to a future with no Charlemagne
(or a different one than history remembers), no Einhard
(or one that history does not remember), no Alcuin rising
to prominence, no Carolingian scriptoriums, no Saxon
conversion to Christianity, no Carolingian Renaissance, no
Louis the Pious, no Lothar, no Charles the Bald, no Louis
the German, and no Treaty of Verdun. With any of these
players or events removed or even diminished, it is
difficult to see how the course of medieval Europe would
not have been entirely different. The Reconquista of AlAndalus should also, at the very least, be questioned as one
considers the implications of an Umayyad victory at
Poitiers. It is difficult to see how Martel’s defeat of Islamic
forces at Poitiers after a century of constant, aggressive,
and unchecked Islamic expansion could be anything but
critical in the scheme of medieval history.
As we know, history unfolded with Martel winning
William E. Watson, “The Battle of Tours-Poitiers Revisited,”
Providence: Studies in Western Civilization (Providence College Press),
1, no. 2 (1993): 51–68; see also Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 2001,
167.
17
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at Poitiers, personally surviving, and ruling Francia. In
737, when King Theuderic IV died, Martel decided against
propping up another Merovingian king; he assumed power
and ruled until his death. 18 When Martel died in 741, his
son Pepin the Short replaced him as Mayor of the Palace.
Pepin and his brother Carloman cooperatively ruled the
Frankish realm. In 751, after having requested the Pope’s
blessing in deposing the titular Merovingian King
Childeric, Pepin the Short was “chosen king and was
anointed by the hand of Archbishop Boniface.”19 Pepin
sent Childeric to a monastery and ordered him tonsured.
The cutting of his hair was likely seen as symbolic of
stripping him of his Merovingian kingship since the
Merovingians prided themselves on their long hair and
uncut beards. In 754, Pope Stephen authenticated Pepin
the Short as king “in the name of the holy Trinity together
with his sons Charles and Carloman.” 20
Pepin’s rule should not be minimized. He skillfully
used war and violence, and through well-executed and
aggressive plans, he executed the Carolingian grand
strategy and expanded the Carolingian domain beyond that
under Martel. Pepin expanded west into Maine, east into
Saxony, and southwest into Aquitaine and Septimania. He
put down challenges in Bavaria, Auxerre, and Burgundy.21
For having received papal assistance in the deposition of
Childeric and coronation of Pepin as king, Pepin waged
war on the Lombards in 755-756. Pepin’s war on the
Dutton, Carolingian Civilization, 12.
“The Elevation of Pepin the Short,” in Carolingian Civilization:
A Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2004), 12; see also Einhard, “The Life of
Charlemagne,” 28.
20
“The Reanointing of Pepin in 754,” in Carolingian Civilization: A
Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004), 13.
21
Judith Herrin, The Formation of Christendom (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987), 390.
18
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Lombards was the first time there was Frankish military
intervention south of the Alps.22 Einhard tells us that Pepin
waged war against Aquitaine for “nine straight years.”23 In
768, Pepin contracted edema and died.
After Pepin’s death, Charlemagne and his brother
Carloman assumed joint control of Francia. The two
brothers had an uneasy relationship exacerbated by
Carloman’s aides, some of whom advocated for armed
conflict to resolve differences. 24 In 769, Charlemagne
believed it was essential to finish the war with Aquitaine
that Pepin the Short had started. Charlemagne requested
assistance from Carloman, but Carloman failed to provide
any help. Despite Carloman withholding aid, Charlemagne
still executed the operation vigorously to a victorious
conclusion.25 Thus, from very early on, after Charlemagne
had taken on his role, he wasted no time in displaying an
aggressive posture, using war and violence—or the threat
of it—to expand Carolingian power and realm.
The brothers’ strained relationship was short-lived.
Carloman suffered an untimely death in 771. At least
some part of the success of Charlemagne’s long and
fruitful rule can be attributed, in part, to Carloman’s death.
While it was undoubtedly inopportune for Carloman, it
may well have been a stroke of splendid fortune for
Charlemagne; according to Einhard, the Franks were of
one accord: Charlemagne became King of the Franks.26
With no divided realm and no siblings to contest holdings,
Charlemagne’s reign was not interrupted by the
internecine conflicts and disruption that plagued future
Carolingians.
Phillip Daileader, “Rise of the Carolingians: Lecture 13,” in The
Early Middle Ages, The Great Courses audio lecture (Chantilly, VA:
The Teaching Company, 2004).
23
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24
Einhard, 29.
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On the contrary, reaping the benefits of the
Carolingian grand strategy sown by the early
Carolingians, Charlemagne was unhindered internally and
proceeded to expand the Carolingian realm through war
and violence, or the threat thereof, over the next four
decades in ways not seen since the Roman Empire proper
some three centuries before. During his first three decades
in power, Charlemagne focused on waging violent
campaigns. Skillfully using war and violence,
Charlemagne kept order, defended his kingdom, expanded
the empire, plundered neighbors, suppressed uprisings,
and converted pagans in neighboring realms to
Christianity. Einhard records that Charlemagne waged
violent campaigns against the Lombards, the Bretons in
Armorica, Islamic warriors in the Spanish March, the
Beneventans, the Bavarians, the Slavs or Welatabi, the
Avars or Huns, the Alemannians, the Bohemians, and the
“Northmen” or Vikings.27
Charlemagne’s longest-lasting war, from 772 to
804, was against the Saxons, who, according to Einhard,
were the most “dreadful” of Charlemagne’s foes, were
“naturally fierce, worshiped demons, and were opposed
to [Christianity].”28 The war was “waged with great
vehemence by both sides” and was at once a brutal war
of expansion and designed to force the Saxons to
convert to Christianity. 29 The Frankish precedent of
waging war for religious purposes would have profound
repercussions for centuries to come.
In 782 at Verden, Charlemagne summarily
executed 4,500 Saxon rebels in response to the decisive
defeat of a troop of Franks by Saxons in the Süntel
mountains.30 After this event, Charlemagne issued the
Einhard, “The Life of Charlemagne,” 30-7.
Einhard, 31.
29
Einhard, 31.
30
Costambeys, et al., Carolingian World, 74.
27
28
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first Saxon capitulary, forcefully compelling the Saxons
to convert to Christianity or face death. 31 Other
capitularies upon the Saxons followed, with most
containing Christian-based commandments or
prohibitions, such as the proscription of ingesting meat
during Lent, to be punished by death, or the decree that
Saxons must tithe.32 There can be little doubt that such
severe impositions on the Saxons played a significant
role in Saxon resistance. 33
Charlemagne’s imposition of Christian ways on
the Saxons did not go unnoticed. One of his greatest aidsde-camp was the renowned scholar, deacon, and poet,
Alcuin of York, who cautioned Charlemagne in 796
against forcing the Saxons to adhere to decrees of
Christianity.34 In his 796 letter, after first praising
Charlemagne for converting many different peoples to
Christianity, Alcuin advised caution for Charlemagne in
imposing tithing upon the newly converted Saxons.
Alcuin referred to the Saxons as “simple people who are
beginners in the faith.”35 Using the early Christian
apostles as models, he reminded Charlemagne that they
never required their newly converted to remit tithes.
While Charlemagne was using war and violence
with great proficiency to expand the Carolingian
civilization, there were “dreadful fore-warnings”
Rosamond McKitterick, Charlemagne: The Formation of
a European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008, 104-5.
32
“The Capitulary on the Saxon Territories,” in Carolingian
Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 66-68.
33
Costambeys et al., Carolingian World, 73-4; see McKitterick,
Charlemagne, 251-2.
34
Alcuin of York, “Advice to the King on Converting the Saxons,” in
Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 125-7.
35
Alcuin, “Advice to the King on Converting the Saxons,” 125-7.
31
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preceding great violence from “heathen men” who were
wont to commit “rapine and slaughter” to the north of,
and along the coast, of Francia. 36 Thus, it would not be
long before the Carolingian civilization would also know
the violent ways of these “heathen men.” 37 In 793, the socalled “Viking Age” was inaugurated with a slaughter of
Christian monks at the remote and highly regarded
Christian monastery of Lindisfarne off the coast of
northeastern England. Sea-faring Scandinavian pirates, or
Vikings, assaulted the wealthy monastery and its unarmed
monastic denizens, killing most or enslaving them, and
looting the great Christian site of its wealth. The Vikings
did not destroy the Lindisfarne monastery; they were
more interested in absconding with booty and slaves, but
they did not hesitate to shed blood in the process.
Christendom was shocked and appalled at the desecration
of this holy Christian place.
Perhaps speaking for all of Western Christendom,
Alcuin expressed his distress and devastation at the attack
in a letter to the Bishop of Lindisfarne, Higbald, with
whom Alcuin communicated regularly and who had
somehow survived the sack of Lindisfarne. Alcuin
responded to a letter from Bishop Higbald that had
informed Alcuin of the violent attack. Alcuin wrote:
“…your tragic sufferings daily bring me sorrow; since the
pagans have desecrated God’s sanctuary, shed the blood
of saints around the altar, laid waste the house of our hope
and trampled the bodies of the saints like dung in the
streets.”38 Alcuin went on to console Higbald, writing that
he would appeal to Charlemagne for assistance in
tracking down and liberating those monks who had been
Carruthers, Bob, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: Illustrated and
Annotated (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2011), 103.
37
Carruthers, Anglo-Saxon, 103.
38
Alcuin of York, “On the Sack of Lindisfarne by the Northmen in
793,” in Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition, ed., Paul
E. Dutton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 124.
36
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taken by the “pagans” as slaves. 39 Alcuin further
expressed his great apprehension:
We and our fathers have now lived in this fair land
for nearly three hundred and fifty years, and never
before has such an atrocity been seen in Britain as
we have now suffered at the hands of a pagan
people. Such an attack was not thought possible.
The church of St Cuthbert is spattered with the
blood of the priests of God, stripped of all its
furnishings, exposed to the plundering of pagans—
a place more sacred than any in Britain…Who is
not afraid at this?40
Some historians have dismissed Alcuin’s words and
descriptions by his contemporaries of Vikings and their
violent ways as “mere monkish exaggeration;” however,
attempts to balance understanding the Vikings have
sometimes led to understating just how violent they were.41
Before establishing settlements, they invariably carried out
extreme acts of brutality, slaughter, and subjugation; and,
they engaged prolifically in slaving activities. The first
documented Viking attack on Frankish territory occurred
during the reign of Charlemagne in 799. 42 As was generally
his way, Charlemagne reacted swiftly and firmly; he
responded to Viking violence with more violence. In 800,
he began erecting formidable defensive fortifications at the
mouths of his empire’s major rivers. 43 Charlemagne, his
sons, and his grandsons all came to know too well of the
Alcuin, “On the Sack of Lindisfarne,” 125.
Stephen Allott, ed., Alcuin of York, c. AD 732 to 804: His Life and
Letters, (York: William Sessions Ltd., 1974), 18.
41
John Haywood, Northmen: The Viking Saga, AD 793-1241 (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 11.
42
Haywood, Northmen, 98.
43
Haywood, 99-100.
39
40
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violent proclivities of the “Northmen.”
In 800, Charlemagne traveled to Rome because a
violent Roman mob had attacked Pope Leo III. The
attackers attempted to gouge out his eyes and cut off his
tongue. Some of the Roman nobility had failed to get one
of their own elected to the papal throne. In the aftermath,
the violent mob accused Pope Leo of moral indiscretions.
Although injured in the attack, Pope Leo escaped and
somehow managed to retain his eyesight and keep his
tongue. He fled north seeking protection from
Charlemagne, who was engaged in fighting the Saxons.
Charlemagne sent the pope back to Rome with an armed
entourage who kept him under constant guard. Once he
was free from other obligations, Charlemagne proceeded to
Rome in support of the Pope. 44
On December 25, 800, Pope Leo III crowned
Charlemagne as Emperor. Many historians consider the
event to be one of the most critical and notable events in
medieval history.45 Charlemagne was the first emperor in
over three centuries. He had significantly expanded the
Frankish realm through his Frankish forces’ highly
effective war-and-violence capabilities, his often decisive
and quick tendency to wield them, and his effective and
charismatic leadership. The Carolingian grand strategy
was on full display. The result was that the Carolingian
Empire was recognized worldwide as a powerful political
and military polity. Even in the latter years of
Charlemagne’s reign, the Carolingian Empire had already
made a lasting impact on the course of the Middle Ages.
Einhard, “The Life of Charlemagne,” 44; Einhard, “Charlemagne
and Pope Leo,” in Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, Second
Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2004), 62-65; see also Norman Cantor, Civilization of the Middle
Ages, A Completely Revised and Expanded Edition of Medieval
History (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 180-1.
45
Herrin, Formation of Christendom, 446.
44
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In 806, carrying on the earlier Merovingian and
Carolingian traditions of splitting territories among male
progeny, Charlemagne issued a public proclamation that
he planned to divide his lands among his three sons:
Charles, Pepin, and Louis. Charlemagne granted Charles,
the eldest of the three, the central and vibrant section of
Francia while giving the other two sons the outlying
lands.46 As it turned out, the proclamation was premature.
Charlemagne’s sons, Charles and Pepin, both died before
Charlemagne. Only Louis outlived Charlemagne, who
died in 814. Just before his death, Charlemagne
summoned Louis to his palace and crowned him
Emperor.47
Although many were saddened and deeply
lamented the death of Charlemagne—the ruler of Francia
for two generations—some considered his death to be an
opening for positive change. 48 They considered it a chance
for a more just ruler and an opportunity to stamp out the
corruption that had crept into Charlemagne’s kingdom
during his final years. Louis the Pious’s supporters and
other disenchanted Franks hoped Louis would be the one
to bring about these positive reforms; however, during
Louis’s reign, there would be an extended period of
fragmentation, decline, and civil war. 49 Moreover, the
Northmen would make their brand of hit and-run war and
violence even more well-known to Francia.
Considered by the biased Thegan to be “the best”
“Charlemagne’s Division of His Kingdoms,” in Carolingian
Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition, ed., Paul E. Dutton (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 146-151.
47
Thegan, “Thegan’s Life of Louis,” in Carolingian Civilization: A
Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004), 160-1.
48
“Lament on Charlemagne’s Death,” in Carolingian Civilization:
A Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2004), 157-8.
49
Dutton, Carolingian Civilization, 157.
46
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of Charlemagne’s sons, Louis early on developed a
reputation of piety and fear of God. 50 Louis continued the
Carolingian war-and violence tradition: in 816, he
dispatched his army to the east to wage war on the Slavs.
Louis proved far more cautious than any of his
forefathers. According to Thegan, Louis “did everything
prudently and cautiously.”51 However, his penchant for
prudence and caution may have contributed to his
inefficient bureaucracy and an inability to check his
power-hungry sons. In 817, Louis released what scholars
call the Ordinatio imperii, a proclamation that formalized
his succession to his three sons, Lothar, Pepin, and Louis
(the German). The reasons for the issuance of the
Ordinatio imperii at that time remain unclear; however,
there is speculation that attributes the act to Louis’s
recognition of his mortality when part of the palace at
Aachen collapsed on Louis and some of his colleagues.52
With the Ordinatio imperii, the most significant part of
the realm was assigned to the oldest of the three, Lothar,
who also was made co-emperor. Pepin was to take
possession of Aquitaine. Louis the German would preside
over Bavaria. These imperial rights were to be fully
exercised upon the death of Louis the Pious. Pepin and
Louis the German were to exercise veneration for Lothar,
lavish him with annual gifts, and seek his counsel on all
matters of import.53
Arguably, the year 822 is when Louis began to
squander away the prestige and power that his father and
Thegan, “Life of Louis,” 160.
Thegan, 165.
52
Dutton, Carolingian Civilization, 199.
53
“The Ordinatio Imperii of 817,” in Carolingian Civilization: A
Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004), 199-203; see also Mayke de Jong, The
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Pious, 814-840, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2526.
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grandfathers had gained so skillfully. Louis felt it
necessary to admit publicly and show remorse for his past
sins upon counsel from his court. Chief among those sins
was the order given by Louis for the blinding of his
nephew Bernard after Bernard had attempted insurrection.
Charlemagne had expressly forbidden such punishment in
his succession arrangement of 806, but Louis had a short
memory. Shortly after Louis’s heavies blinded Bernard,
he died. The death of Bernard haunted Louis; thus, his
public penance, and with the penance, arguably, the loss
of prestige.54
Although history records Louis the Pious as
generally feckless and impotent, he demonstrated early on
that he was a skilled warrior and effective battlefield
commander.55 In 824, Louis inflicted violence upon the
Bretons and “laid waste to the whole land with a great
blow” in response to Breton perfidy. 56 Apparently,
however, Louis’s effectiveness on the battlefield was lost
on his sons, and in the 830s, the relationship between
Louis and his sons became greatly strained. The
Astronomer, another biographer of Louis the Pious,
recorded “the Rebellions” in detail.57 After Louis’s wife
Ermengard died—the mother of Lothar, Pepin, and
Louis—Louis the Pious remarried, taking Judith as his
wife. By her, he had a son, Charles (the Bald). The other
sons, Lothar, Pepin, and Louis the German, were resentful
of Charles, especially after Louis the Pious announced
plans to give Charles some lands (to be consummated upon
the death of Louis the Pious). To make matters even worse,
“Louis’s Public Penance in 822,” in Carolingian Civilization: A
Reader, Second Edition, ed., Paul E. Dutton (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 2004), 256-265.
55
De Jong, Penitential State, 14.
56
Thegan, “Life of Louis,” 168.
57
Astronomer, “Account of the Rebellions,” in Carolingian
Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton
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Pepin and Louis the German resented the elder brother
Lothar because of his co-emperor status. Louis the Pious
seemed unable to control his narcissistic sons, or at the
very least, he tolerated their insolence beyond reason; his
sons imprisoned him twice and attempted to seize power.
Louis the Pious was freed each time by the younger sons
when they reversed their allegiance to Lothar (hoping the
act would enhance their standing with Louis the Pious and
thus increase their holdings). Through it all, and in the
aftermath, Louis the Pious never renounced or disowned
any of his sons.
In 838, Pepin died, and Louis the Pious awarded
Pepin’s lands to Charles the Bald. Lothar was infuriated.
Louis the Pious died in 840 after a campaign against the
rebellious Louis the German. 58 After Louis’s death, the
three sons, Lothar, Louis the German, and Charles the
Bald, fought a bloody civil war to control the Frankish
realm. In what was arguably the beginning of the end of
the Carolingian great but relatively short run of success,
Lothar was pitted against Louis the German and Charles
the Bald in an attempt to gain control of their lands. Just
as they had always done, the Carolingians turned to war
and violence to settle power, control, and expansion
issues, no matter that this time the war was against other
Carolingians. Nithard documented the Carolingian fall
from grace.59 Unlike the conflicts between Louis the Pious
and his sons, which primarily consisted of posturing,
meetings, discussions, and maneuverings, the civil war
between the three brothers was bloody, exemplified in the
Battle of Fontenoy, recorded by Nithard as having been a
Astronomer, “The Final Days and Death of Louis the Pious,” in
Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition, ed., Paul E. Dutton
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 291-4.
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“violent battle on the brook of the Burgundians.” 60 The
level of violence and slaughter at the Battle of Fontenoy
was a “shock” to contemporaries, as chronicled by
Engelbert.61
During this time of the Carolingian civilization, war
and violence were not just limited to the civil war. As the
brothers and their factions warred, Northmen attacks on
Francia continued to increase in volume and intensity. The
Scandinavians likely knew of the internecine violence of
the Franks and took advantage of it. Even before Louis the
Pious had died, in the 830s, Viking raids had intensified.
In 843, the civil war ended. The three sons arrived
at a formal settlement to divide the empire with the Treaty
of Verdun. The Treaty of Verdun has sometimes been called
the “Birth Certificate” of Europe; however, it might also
be reasonably referred to as the “Death Certificate” of the
Carolingian Empire.62 The brothers agreed to split the
realm into three parts: Charles the Bald received the
western third of Francia, Louis the German received the
eastern third of Francia, and Lothar received the middle
realm. With the Treaty of Verdun, a division was
established that formed the basis for the future states of
France and Germany; such was its influence on future
events. There was more warring in the 850s, and
eventually, the eastern and western realms expanded at the
expense of the middle domain.
In the 880s, under Emperor Charles the Fat, the
empire was once again briefly united under one ruler.
Contemporaries longed to see the former eminence of the
Nithard, “Nithard’s History,” 315.
Engelbert, “Engelbert at the Battle of Fontenoy,” in Carolingian
Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition, ed. Paul E. Dutton (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 332-3.
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Carolingians; however, the unity under Charles the Fat was
short-lived. Charles the Fat also had to contend with savage
Viking raids, which continued to intensify and arguably
contributed to his demise. In 885, Vikings laid siege to
Paris. Charles the Fat’s paralysis during the crisis earned
him no followers. With Abbo’s chronicling of the event and
the Viking wars with the empire recorded elsewhere, it is
evident that although the Carolingians had once been so
powerfully effective at dominating adversaries so
overwhelmingly and expanding the empire, they were now
unable primarily to protect the realm and keep it free from
the violence of the savage Northmen interlopers.63
Interestingly, Dutton suggests that instead of
bringing the Carolingian Empire to its knees, the Viking
invasions perhaps stimulated Western civilization and
helped to reallocate wealth; however, it is difficult to
imagine that Viking violence did not play a significant role
in the collapse of the empire. 64 To be sure, at the very least,
the image, both internally and beyond the Frankish realm,
of the seemingly invincible Carolingian Empire had been
shattered. The Carolingian grand strategy had run its
course. There was perhaps no better example of this than
when Charles the Fat paid the Vikings a sum of 700 pounds
of silver to break off the siege of Paris and allowed them
to attack Burgundy further up the Seine River. 65
This paper examined the nature and impact of war
and violence—both by internal forces and external
forces—in the development and maintenance of the
Carolingian world, using a strong collection of primary
Abbo, “Abbo’s Account of the Siege of Paris by the Northmen,” in
Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, Second Edition ed. Paul E. Dutton
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 514-6; see also “The
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Toronto Press, 2004), 507-512.
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sources assembled by Paul E. Dutton and a compelling
supplement of notable secondary sources. 66 Additionally,
this paper has discussed the extent to which the
aggressive Carolingians affected medieval history by
developing a grand strategy supported by military and
political assets that solidified the Carolingian polity
through war and violence. Some final words: the
Carolingian Empire was the most expansive and most
potent state to date after the Western Roman Empire
collapsed. Paradoxically, through war and violence and
the threat of war and violence, Charlemagne brought
peace, security, and education to the Frankish realm,
leading to hardy trade and a resurgence of culture, later
known as the Carolingian Renaissance. Indubitably,
Charlemagne utilized and enhanced the military and
political infrastructures created by his predecessors, Pepin
and Martel; nonetheless, Charlemagne’s accomplishments
stand on their own. At the time of Charlemagne’s death,
the Carolingian Empire was renowned and respected the
world over.
Just as the Carolingian civilization came to power
through a grand strategy that relied on the sword, its
demise came about by the sword. Repeated savage Viking
raids, bloody civil wars, political distraction, paralysis, and
incompetence plagued it. The relatively short-lived
Carolingian Empire indeed left long-lived consequences in
the form of Europeanization, specifically with the Treaty of
Verdun serving as the genesis for the formation of France
and Germany; and, what some historians call a
Carolingian Renaissance (made possible by war, violence,
conquest, and plunder); conversion to Christianity of
neighboring peoples; and, implications for the future in
regards to religious or holy war, that is, waging war to
compel an external group to adopt a religion. The
Carolingians also bequeathed to posterity the area
66
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formerly known as Lotharingia, which continued to be the
focus of armed conflict and bloodshed even into the
twentieth century.

